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Abstract Process reliabilism says that a belief is justified iff the belief-forming process that produced 
it is sufficiently reliable. But any token belief-forming process is an instance of a number of different 
belief-forming process types. The problem of specifying the relevant type is known as the ‘generality 
problem’ for process reliabilism. This paper proposes a broadly relativist solution to the generality 
problem. The thought is that the relevant belief-forming process type is relative to the context. 
While the basic idea behind the solution is from Mark Heller (1995), the solution defended here 
departs from Heller on a crucial point. Because of this departure, my solution avoids a serious 
problem with Heller’s solution. 
Process reliabilism says that a belief is justified iff the belief-forming process that produced it is 
sufficiently reliable (see Goldman 1979). But types of belief-forming processes are reliable, not token 
belief-forming processes, and any token belief-forming process is a token of a number of different 
belief-forming process types. Take my belief that there is an oak tree in front of me. The process by 
which this belief was produced is a token of the following types: perception of a visual stimulus, 
perception of a visual stimulus in normal conditions, perception of an object shaped like an oak tree, 
and so on.1 Which of these process types is the relevant process type? The question is important 
because, first, absent an answer to this question process reliabilism is an incomplete theory of 
justification and, second, it may be that some of the process types are reliable whereas others aren’t. 
Call this the ‘generality problem’.2  
                                                 
1 Adler and Levin (2002, pp. 90-4) argue that these descriptions refer to the same process, but at 
different levels of generality. I set this aside here, but see Comesaña (2006, pp. 35-7) for criticism. 
2 While e.g. Goldman (1979, p. 11), recognises the problem, it is most forcefully stated in Conee and 
Feldman (1998). 
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I will propose a broadly relativist solution to the problem. According to this solution, whether a given 
process type is relevant is relative to the context. This has the consequence that a belief may count as 
reliable and so as justified relative to one context but not relative to another.3 While Mark Heller (1995) 
defends a similar solution, the solution defended here differs in that it appeals to a far broader notion 
of context. As we will see, this means my solution avoids a serious problem with Heller’s solution. I 
start by outlining the relativist solution. I then contrast my solution with Heller’s. I finish by saying 
something about relativism in epistemology. 
Relativism and Generality 
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (1998) argue that a reliabilist solution to the generality problem must 
provide a general principle we can use to identify the relevant belief-forming process type instantiated 
by each belief-forming process token. Consider one of their candidates (which they credit to Alston 
1995 and Baergen 1995): 
PRINCIPLE: The relevant type for any belief-forming process token t is the psychological kind that is part 
of the best psychological explanation of the belief that results from t (1998, p. 17). 
It is plausible that PRINCIPLE will narrow down the set of relevant belief-forming process types. But, 
as Conee & Feldman argue, there will almost always be more than one actually operative 
psychologically real type for each belief-forming process token (p. 12). For instance, the various belief-
forming process types instantiated by the process by which I formed my belief that there is an oak 
tree in front of me - perception of a visual stimulus, perception of a visual stimulus in normal 
conditions, perception of an object shaped like an oak tree – are all psychologically real. Because all 
of these types seem good candidates for explaining my belief, PRINCIPLE does not solve the generality 
problem. 
There are two problems with Conee & Feldman’s argument here. First, as Heller (1995) emphasises, 
it is unclear why a reliabilist solution to the generality problem has to provide a general principle. 
Consider an example from Heller (p. 503). My car is reliable. When I turn the key, it almost always 
starts. So the process by which my car started this morning is a reliable process. This token process is 
an instance of any number of process types: starting in normal conditions, starting after the key has 
                                                 
3 That is, if we assume that some of the relevant process types are reliable, whereas others aren’t.  
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been turned, starting in the morning, and so on. Being able to distinguish my car from cars that don’t 
start reliably doesn’t require a general principle for determining what the relevant process type is. 
Similarly, being able to distinguish reliable from non-reliable belief-forming process types doesn’t 
require a general principle for determining what the relevant process type is.  
Second, whether a candidate explanation of some phenomenon is the best explanation of that 
phenomenon is plausibly a context-relative matter.4 To see why, consider a mundane example.5 A car 
has crashed at a roundabout. The driver of the car was fed up waiting for his chance to move, and got 
impatient. This isn’t an isolated incident. Due to bad traffic, a lot of cars crash at this roundabout. 
Here are two candidate explanations of the crash. First, the car crashed because of the impatience of 
the driver. Second, the car crashed because of bad traffic. Both candidates are explanations of the 
crash - it would be true to say both that the crash was caused by the impatience of the driver and that 
it was caused by bad traffic. In general, a myriad of factors can be cited as ‘the’ explanation of any 
given event. So the key question is which of the two candidates is the best explanation. And, to answer 
this question, we need to know what the explanation is for. Take a jury that has been charged with 
determining who was responsible for the crash. While the bad traffic conditions may play a role in 
their deliberations - e.g. by mitigating the severity of the offence - it seems clear that, for their purposes, 
the driver’s reckless behaviour is far more important than the traffic conditions. Now take someone 
charged with improving transport in the city who is investigating why a number of crashes, including 
this one, happened. Here, it seems clear that, for these purposes, the bad traffic conditions are more 
important than the reckless behaviour of individual drivers. So, which of our explanations is best 
depends on the context, and in particular on the purpose for which the explanation is required.  
I want to emphasise three features of the sorts of contexts I have in mind. I will call contexts with 
these three features ‘broad contexts’.  
The first feature is that these contexts are objective. What is at issue is whether a candidate explanation 
really is the best given the purposes for which it is needed, not whether anyone thinks it is the best. 
This is important because we can be wrong about which candidate explanation is best. This is most 
                                                 
4 For the view that causal explanation talk is generally context-relative see Lewis (1986). 
5 This example is from Greco (2008, p. 420), who appeals to it in a related context, although not in 
the context of discussing the generality problem. 
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obvious in cases where we are unaware of various candidate explanations. Imagine that the jury is 
unaware that the driver behaved recklessly because this didn’t come to light during the court case. 
Whether the jury is aware of it or not, the best explanation of the crash given their purposes is his 
reckless driving. (If the jury were to later become aware that the driver was reckless we would say that 
they have “realised” that this is the best explanation, which suggests it always was the best explanation, 
given their purposes).6 
The second feature is that broad contexts will not give us a complicated general principle which says, 
for each context, what the best explanation is in that context. If contexts were to give us such 
principles, it would have to be possible to identify some sort of ‘function’ from features of the context 
to the best explanation. Perhaps this can be done in simple cases, like our case of the car crash. But 
there is no reason to think it can be done in more complicated cases. Consider the financial crash in 
2008. Whether a candidate explanation of why the financial crash happened is the best explanation 
depends on the context. In some contexts, an explanation that involves subprime mortgages will be 
the best. In other contexts, an explanation that involves the boom and bust cycles in contemporary 
capitalist economies will be the best. But it would be foolhardy to think there is always a way of 
computing a function that will tell us which explanations will be best in which contexts. To say that 
the best explanation depends on the context is to say that debate about which explanation is the best 
can legitimately involve citing factors of our present context, such as the purposes for which the 
explanation is required. It is not to say that the facts about explanation are somehow already ‘contained 
in’ the context. 
The third feature is that broad contexts differ from what is called the ‘context of utterance’ or the 
‘conversational context’.7 We can think of a conversational context as a conversational situation in 
which the participants make various conversational moves - they assert things, challenge assertions, 
and retract their assertions if necessary. The theoretical role of such contexts is to provide the referents 
                                                 
6 While more could be said about the notion of ‘being best given one’s purposes’, I assume it is 
sufficiently intuitive to be useful. 
7 Strictly speaking, there are two options here. The first is to distinguish broad contexts from 
conversational contexts, as in the main body of the text. The second is to subsume conversational 
contexts under broad contexts. I favour the first option because (as I argue below) conversational 
contexts aren’t usually taken to be objective, unlike my broad contexts (but see Gauker 1998). 
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for context-sensitive terms of natural languages (see Kaplan 1989 and Lewis 1979). For instance, 
expressions like “I”, “tall” and maybe “justified” are context-sensitive: the contribution they make to 
the propositions expressed by sentences containing them depends on the context. If I say “I am tired” 
I express the proposition XX is tired.8 If you say “I am tired” you express the proposition YY is tired. 
But my broad contexts are not intended to play (or, at least, to primarily play) this theoretical role. 
Rather, broad contexts are what we need to determine which candidate explanation of a phenomenon 
is the best explanation in any given case. For any given phenomenon we have a large number of 
candidate explanations, and which one of these candidates has the property of being the best 
explanation depends on the purposes for which the explanation is needed, i.e. on the broad context. 
In different contexts different explanations will have this property.  
Applying this to the generality problem, the tentative solution is that the belief-forming process type 
instantiated by a given belief-forming process token is relative to the context. So, in each context, 
there will be a single belief-forming process type that is the best explanation of the relevant belief 
token, and which type this is will depend on the purposes of whoever is evaluating whether a token 
belief is justified or not. Take a concrete belief, e.g. Ravonda’s belief that a postal worker is outside 
her front door. The belief-forming process type relevant for evaluating whether Ravonda’s belief is 
justified depends on the purpose of the evaluator. This leads us to Heller, who defends a solution to 
the generality problem along these lines.9 
                                                 
8 I use italics for propositions here. 
9 The cognoscenti will wonder whether this solution is ‘contextualist’ or ‘relativist’. The usual way of 
distinguishing contextualism and relativism is at the level of semantics (see e.g. MacFarlane 2014, 
Ch. 1, Ch. 3), but I prefer to distinguish the views at the level of metaphysics. The contextualist 
version would say, roughly, that there is no such thing as being the best explanation of a token belief 
simpliciter. Rather, explanations can only have the relational property of being best relative to this-or-
that context. The upshot is that token beliefs can only have the relational property of being justified 
relative to this-or-that context. The relativist version would say that the property of being the best 
explanation of a token belief is a genuinely relative property. The upshot is that token beliefs have 
the non-relational property of being justified in some contexts, and lack that property in other 
contexts. While making sense of genuinely relative properties takes some work, for a spirited attempt 
see Einheuser (2008). For my purposes here I stay neutral between these two views. 
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Heller’s Solution 
Imagine Ravonda is looking through a window when she forms the belief that a postal worker is 
outside her front door (Heller 1995, p. 509). Ravonda’s belief-forming process instantiates a range of 
psychologically real belief-forming process types. What these types are depend on a combination of 
her internal mental processes and her external environment. For instance, if Ravonda is in normal 
conditions, her belief forming process instantiates the type ‘visual perception of a postal worker-
shaped object in normal conditions’. The reliabilist says that whether Ravonda’s belief is justified 
depends on whether the belief forming process type that produced her belief is a reliable process. 
Heller points out that definite description phrases like “the belief-forming process type” are, in 
general, context-sensitive (p. 505). If I say “the cat is on the mat”, the context in which I say this – the 
context of utterance or conversational context – determines which cat I am referring to. So Heller’s 
view is that whether Ravonda’s belief is justified depends on whether the belief-forming process type 
that is picked out by the context-sensitive phrase “the belief-forming process type” is reliable. 
This strongly suggests that Heller’s proposal is best understood in terms of conversational contexts, 
not broad contexts.10 Recall that conversational contexts provide us with ‘parameters’ that we use to 
determine the referents of context-sensitive expressions. If the participants in a conversation about 
whether Ravonda’s belief is justified agree to focus on a particular belief-forming process, then that 
process will be one of the parameters we can read off this conversational context. For instance, if the 
participants agree that Ravonda is in normal conditions, they may settle on the belief-forming process 
type ‘visual perception of a postal worker-shaped object in normal conditions’. If this happens, then 
the phrase “the belief forming process that caused Ravonda’s belief” refers to this belief-forming 
process type. 
Unlike broad contexts, conversational contexts are usually taken to involve a mix of objective and 
‘intention-sensitive’ or subjective features.11 Some of the parameters that settle the reference of 
context-sensitive terms are clearly objective. For instance, if Saskia utters the sentence “I am tired”, 
her context provides a ‘speaker parameter’ that determines the referent of “I” as Saskia (see Kaplan 
                                                 
10 While Heller often says that definite description phrases are “richly context-sensitive”, he still 
seems to understand them as sensitive to the conversational context, as opposed to what I’m calling 
the broad context (e.g. 1995, pp. 502-4). 
11 Again, Gauker (1998) is an exception. Unfortunately I lack the space to deal with this issue here. 
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1989). This doesn’t change if Saskia is confused about her identity. In this sense, the speaker parameter 
is objective - it doesn’t depend on Saskia’s beliefs about her identity, her referential intentions, or 
anything like that. However, other parameters are clearly intention-sensitive/subjective. For instance, 
consider a context where one of the speakers says “the cat is on the mat”. Their context will provide 
a parameter that determines the referent of “the cat”, but which cat this is will depend on things like 
the referential intentions of the speaker, her beliefs about which cats are around, and so on.12  
Returning to Ravonda, her belief-forming process instantiates various belief-forming process types 
that are psychologically real. Now imagine a conversational context in which the participants have a 
lot of false beliefs about how Ravonda formed her belief. While Ravonda is in normal conditions and 
has normally functioning perception, they take her to be in abnormal conditions, and to not have 
perceptual abilities that are suited to these abnormal conditions. Because of their false beliefs, the 
participants agree to focus on a belief-forming process type – say, ‘visual perception of a postal 
worker-shaped object in abnormal conditions’ – that is not instantiated by Ravonda’s actual belief-
forming process. If Heller’s view is that the conversational context settles which belief-forming 
process type is relevant, he seems forced to say that the context provides a ‘belief-forming process 
parameter’ that determines the referent of “the belief-forming process that produced Ravonda’s 
belief” as ‘visual perception of a postal worker-shaped object in abnormal conditions’.13 This is because 
it is the belief-forming process type that is relevant given the referential intentions and (false) beliefs 
that the conversational participants have about how Ravonda formed her belief. But Heller’s view 
surely gets the wrong result here. What we want to say is that the context selects one of the belief-
                                                 
12 This example is taken from Stanley (2005, pp. 26-7), who uses it in the context of articulating and 
defending the ‘intention sensitive’ view defended here. 
13 Heller gives the impression that he doesn’t want to give this verdict about this sort of case. He 
says that it is “important not to overemphasize the context’s contribution at the expense of the 
world’s, because if we do we will end up making our accounts of reliability and knowledge too 
subjective” (1995, p. 506). The problem, though, is that he doesn’t want to overemphasise the 
world’s contribution either. In his view, objective facts such as facts about Ravonda’s psychology are 
insufficient to determine a single belief-forming process type; subjective facts are required to fill the 
gap. But in Ravonda’s case there are no subjective facts we can use to single out any psychologically 
real belief-forming process types. If Heller insists that the subjective facts don’t fix the relevant type 
as ‘visual perception of a postal worker-shaped object in abnormal conditions’ here, then it is unclear 
what does fix the relevant type (it can’t be objective facts). Thus, the generality problem would 
remain unsolved.  
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forming process types actually instantiated by Ravonda’s belief-forming process. But, if we focus on 
conversational contexts, we can’t say that.14 
This problem disappears if we replace Heller’s conversational contexts with my broad contexts.  Given 
their purposes (evaluating Ravonda’s belief), the best explanation why she has her belief is that she 
has had a visual perception of a postal worker-shaped object in normal conditions. That the 
conversational participants aren’t aware that this is the best explanation is beside the point. The 
relevant belief-forming process type is the type the participants should be considering, given their 
purposes, not the type they actually consider. So the way to modify Heller’s view to get the right results 
is to replace conversational contexts with broad contexts. 
Relativism in Epistemology  
In contemporary epistemology a number of proposals that are ‘relativist’ in the broad sense meant 
here have been defended on the basis of a range of linguistic data (see e.g. Brogaard 2008, DeRose 
2009 and MacFarlane 2014). This paper has taken a somewhat different tack. Defending reliabilism in 
epistemology requires solving the generality problem, and we can solve the generality problem if we 
adopt a sort of epistemic relativism. But there are other problems for reliabilism. For instance, 
defending reliabilism requires, first, specifying how reliable a belief-forming process type has to be in 
order to yield justification and knowledge and, second, doing so in a non-ad hoc way. Laurence 
BonJour (2010) has called this the ‘threshold problem’. An initially attractive idea is that, while we can 
perhaps rule out especially low and high levels of reliability, the precise level is going to have to depend 
on features of what I have called broad contexts, such as purposes. So relativism gives us some hope 
of solving the threshold problem too. (Of course, a good deal more would need to be said here). 
While linguistic data may provide some motivation for relativism in epistemology, it is my view that 
the case for relativism is better made by appealing to difficulties in what we might call the metaphysics 
of epistemic properties like justification and knowledge. If the reliabilist wants to defend a view on 
which a belief has the property of being justified iff it is produced by a reliable belief-forming process 
then she faces a number of questions. What is the relevant process? How reliable does a process need 
                                                 
14 This objection is similar to Conee & Feldman’s (1998, pp. 20-4) objection to Heller, although I 
have phrased it rather differently. 
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to be, and why? If we think that answering these questions requires bringing in contexts, then we have 
good reason to adopt relativism, and this reason is independent of any linguistic considerations.15 
Summing Up 
I have argued that the generality problem can be solved if we say that which belief-forming process 
type is the best explanation of a token belief depends on the context. On the assumption that some 
candidate processes are reliable whereas others aren’t, it follows that the belief may be reliable, and so 
justified, relative to one context, but not relative to another. Thus, this paper has provided an indirect 
argument for a sort of epistemic relativism on which whether a belief has the property of being 
justified is relative to the context. Insofar as process reliabilism is the best theory of justification, and 
insofar as this relativist solution is the best solution to the generality problem, we have reason to adopt 
this sort of epistemic relativism, and we have this reason independently of linguistic considerations 
for or against epistemic relativism.16 
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